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Car accidents that lead to personal injury can be difficult and unfortunate, but recovery from them is not. Attorney Rafael Gomez helps you through the entire process of obtaining a truce from motor vehicleaccidents.
We understand that each Car Accident Case is unique and must be treated with extreme precision. For this reason, the accidentlawyer Rafael Gomez is specialized in traffic accidents and personal injury, and assists in the entire legal process.
Motor vehicleaccidents often have a number of overlapping factors that can be difficult to understand. Who was the culprit in the accident? Who must pay for damages? Does my insurance cover my injury? Our expert lawyer helps you understand the far-flung implications and guides you to the best possible outcome.
Motorcycleaccidents are the leading cause of traffic fatalities in the US. Cases range from minor injuries to serious damages, each of which requires a different legal resolution. Attorney Rafael Gomez is an expert in personal injury and years of experience help you get justice.
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THIS IS A SAMPLE OF HOW SOME ACCIDENT CASES ARE DECIDED BY THE NJ COURTS. OUR FIRM DID NOT PARTICIPATE AS COUNSEL IN THIS CASE. THIS IS MERELY A SAMPLE SUMMARY FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES. PAST RESULTS DO NOT GUARANTEE FUTURE OUTCOME. THE SELECTION OF AN ATTORNEY IS IMPORTANT. GIVE THIS MATTER CAREFUL THOUGHT. SEE OUR ABOUT PAGE FOR LEGAL ADVERTISEMENT DISCLAIMER.
PALISADES INSURANCE COMPANY VS. HORIZON BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF NEW JERSEY (L-6136-19, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
Plaintiff Palisades Insurance Company appeals from a February 28, 2020 order granting defendant Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey's motion for summary judgment and dismissing its complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff is an automobile insurance company that provides mandatory personal injury protection (PIP) benefits for medical expenses arising out of injuries sustained during car accidents. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.3(d), plaintiff allows its customers to designate their health insurer as primary for payment of car-accident-injury-related expenses, which election results in a premium reduction. The insureds named in plaintiff's complaint each elected to have defendant act as the primary payor. Despite the designation, plaintiff received and paid the claims, before they were properly submitted to defendant. On appeal, plaintiff asserts that it has a right to be reimbursed for the medical expenses it voluntarily paid under a theory of subrogation.
After reviewing the provisions of the New Jersey Automobile Reparations Reform Act (No-Fault Act), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 to -35, the Coordination of Benefits scheme (COB), N.J.A.C. 11:3-37.1 to -37.14, and case law, the court concluded that no cause of action for subrogation exists to allow a PIP carrier to pursue reimbursement from a health insurer for claims mistakenly paid out of turn. Plaintiff's remedies are to deny the claim upon receipt, recover payments from the medical providers, request that the insureds submit their claims to defendant and pursue an appeal if coverage is denied, or obtain an assignment of rights and pursue the appeals on the insureds' behalf. In addition, when a health carrier is exempt from providing benefits, the COB regulations allow the PIP carrier to recoup the amount of the reduced premium from its insured. None of these remedies were pursued by plaintiff in this case.
The court also concluded that further discovery would be futile, as the sought-after information is not capable of overcoming the legal obstacle faced by defendants: the absence of a legal right of subrogation to recoup payments mistakenly made out of turn.
Hiring an accident lawyer can result in greater compensation for your damages. Instead of settling for less than your case is worth or allowing an insurer to unfairly deny your claim, take a stand and protect your rights. Hire caraccidentattorney Rafael Gomez in Hackensack to represent your interests during injury settlement negotiations and/or an injury trial in New Jersey. Trusting professionals with your caraccident case can safeguard your future after a serious injuryaccident.
THIS IS A SAMPLE OF HOW SOME ACCIDENT CASES ARE DECIDED BY THE NJ COURTS. OUR FIRM DID NOT PARTICIPATE AS COUNSEL IN THIS CASE. THIS IS MERELY A SAMPLE SUMMARY FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES. PAST RESULTS DO NOT GUARANTEE FUTURE OUTCOME. THE SELECTION OF AN ATTORNEY IS IMPORTANT. GIVE THIS MATTER CAREFUL THOUGHT. SEE OUR ABOUT PAGE FOR LEGAL ADVERTISEMENT DISCLAIMER.
PATRICIA REIDER v. ALLSTATE NEW JERSEY INSURANCE COMPANY
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-5772-05.
Stephen M. Tatonetti argued the cause for appellants (DuBois, Sheehan, Hamilton, Levin & Weissman, attorneys; Mr. Tatonetti, on the brief).
Francis X. Ryan argued the cause for respondent (Green, Lundgren & Ryan, P.C., attorneys; Mr. Ryan and Alexa J. Nasta, on the brief).
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PER CURIAM
Plaintiffs, Patricia Reider and Douglas Reider, appeal from a jury verdict of no cause for action in a damages-only automobile negligence trial. Because the tortfeasor was uninsured, plaintiffs instituted suit against their automobile insurance carrier, defendant Allstate New Jersey Insurance Company (Allstate). On appeal, plaintiffs raise eight claims of error, seven of which involve the trial judge's decision to admit or bar evidence, and the eighth concerns the denial of plaintiff Douglas Reider's motion for a directed verdict. We affirm.
I.
On October 10, 1999, plaintiffs, who are mother and son, were seated in Patricia's vehicle at an intersection waiting for the traffic light to turn green when a car came up behind them, crashed at a high rate of speed into the right rear portion of plaintiffs' vehicle, took off and crashed into a telephone pole. Patricia testified that she and her son were "too scared and nervous to go to the hospital" at the time, but two days later she and Douglas were evaluated by their family physician. Both complained of pain in their low back. Patricia produced evidence that she sustained lumbar sprain and strain, and a bulging disc at L5-S1. Although an orthopedic surgeon recommended surgery, Patricia was "afraid" and chose not to undergo the recommended surgery. According to Douglas's physician, he sustained a herniated lumbar disc.
On the day before jury selection commenced, Allstate moved in limine to bar plaintiffs from identifying defendant as Allstate Insurance Company, and to instead require them to refer to the actual tortfeasor, Matthew Thomas, as the defendant. In that same motion, Allstate also sought to bar plaintiffs from testifying that Thomas was operating a stolen vehicle and was being chased by police at the time of the collision. In support of its in limine motion, Allstate argued that because liability was stipulated, and Thomas's flight from police had no bearing on whether plaintiffs' injuries were permanent, plaintiffs should be precluded from testifying that Thomas fled the scene or was driving a stolen vehicle.
In opposition, plaintiffs argued that if the motion were to be granted, their credibility while testifying would be adversely affected. Plaintiffs asserted that an order prohibiting them from discussing the hit-and-run nature of the accident would require them "not to tell the entire truth to the jury" and would cause them to "seem more nervous on the stand" in an effort to avoid running afoul of the in limine order. Relying on Taddei v. State Farm Indemnity Co., 401 N.J. Super. 449, 464 (App. Div. 2008); Bardis v. First Trenton Insurance Co., 397 N.J. Super. 138, 152 (App. Div. 2007), certif. granted, 194 N.J. 444 (2008); and Wenz v. Allstate Insurance Co., 316 N.J. Super. 570, 573-74 (App. Div. 1998), Judge Blue rejected plaintiffs' arguments. The judge reasoned that plaintiffs' credibility would not be affected because they would be permitted to explain how fast the other vehicle was traveling at the time of the accident; the force of the impact; the number of police who responded to the scene; and that plaintiffs never spoke with Thomas, the tortfeasor. The judge emphasized that her in limine order was limited to the fact of the police chase and that Thomas fled the scene after the collision with plaintiffs' vehicle.
In opposition, plaintiffs argued that if the motion were to be granted, their credibility while testifying would be adversely affected. Plaintiffs asserted that an order prohibiting them from discussing the hit-and-run nature of the accident would require them "not to tell the entire truth to the jury" and would cause them to "seem more nervous on the stand" in an effort to avoid running afoul of the in limine order. Relying on Taddei v. State Farm Indemnity Co., 401 N.J. Super. 449, 464 (App. Div. 2008); Bardis v. First Trenton Insurance Co., 397 N.J. Super. 138, 152 (App. Div. 2007), certif. granted, 194 N.J. 444 (2008); and Wenz v. Allstate Insurance Co., 316 N.J. Super. 570, 573-74 (App. Div. 1998), Judge Blue rejected plaintiffs' arguments. The judge reasoned that plaintiffs' credibility would not be affected because they would be permitted to explain how fast the other vehicle was traveling at the time of the accident; the force of the impact; the number of police who responded to the scene; and that plaintiffs never spoke with Thomas, the tortfeasor. The judge emphasized that her in limine order was limited to the fact of the police chase and that Thomas fled the scene after the collision with plaintiffs' vehicle.
Here, we are satisfied that Judge Blue's decision to bar plaintiffs from describing the police chase or referring to Thomas's status as a hit-and-run driver was well within her discretion. Her reliance on Taddei, supra, Bardis, supra, and Wenz, supra, was correct. Moreover, any testimony by plaintiffs that Thomas stole the car and was fleeing from police would have been inadmissible hearsay in any event, because plaintiffs' knowledge on those subjects was derived solely from what police told them. As such, the testimony would have been inadmissible regardless of our decisions in Taddei, Bardis and Wenz, all of which held that the action should be maintained in the name of the uninsured tortfeasor, rather than the insurance carrier. The claims plaintiffs advance in Points I and II therefore lack merit. We thus affirm the judge's decision to designate Thomas, rather than Allstate, as defendant during the trial, and to bar reference to the hit-and-run nature of the accident.
II.
In Point IV, plaintiffs argue that even if the trial judge's rulings on those issues had been correct, Allstate "opened the door" to admission of the previously-barred hit-and-run testimony when, during its opening statement, it argued that plaintiffs sought an attorney prior to receiving medical attention. Plaintiffs argued before the trial judge that Allstate's reference to plaintiffs consulting a lawyer before seeking medical treatment "opened the door" to the true reason they sought legal advice before medical care--because they were victims of a hit-and-run crash. Although Judge Blue concluded that Allstate had not opened the door, she nonetheless permitted plaintiffs to testify that they consulted a lawyer because of police involvement at the scene. We find no abuse of discretion in her determination that the in limine order should not be disturbed. Her ruling was a balanced and fair resolution of this issue, and we have been presented with no meritorious basis upon which to disturb it.
III.
In Point III, plaintiffs argue that the judge erred when she permitted Allstate to introduce photographs of the damage to plaintiffs' vehicle without requiring Allstate to also introduce photographs of the vehicle Thomas was driving. Plaintiffs argue that "[t]o allow the photographs to be introduced without proper explanation about the happening of the accident was prejudicial and confused the jury." This argument lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
IV.
In Point V, Patricia argues that the judge committed reversible error when she barred Patricia from testifying that she became addicted to pain medication prescribed to her as a result of the accident. Significantly, Patricia was permitted to, and did, testify about the pain medication that her physician prescribed, and why she needed pain medication. The only issue she was not permitted to mention was her alleged addiction. Because plaintiff did not proffer any expert testimony to support her claim of addiction, Judge Blue correctly excluded it. See Kelly v. Berlin, 300 N.J. Super. 256, 267 (App. Div. 1997) (holding that if a subject is not within the common knowledge of a jury, expert opinion is required).
V.
In Point VI, Douglas argues that the judge erred when she denied his motion for a directed verdict. He contends that the herniated disc he suffered as a result of the accident qualifies as a permanent injury, thus entitling him to a directed verdict. In particular, he sought an instruction that if the jury found he sustained a herniated disc as a result of the accident, he had thereby demonstrated a permanent injury as a matter of law. In support of that argument, he relied on Pardo v. Dominguez, 382 N.J. Super. 489, 490-92 (App. Div. 2006), where we held that a herniated disc, demonstrated through an MRI, is sufficient to satisfy the verbal threshold.
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A motion for a directed verdict, filed pursuant to Rule 4:40-1, must be denied whenever a jury could, even if it accepted all of the evidence that supports the position of the moving party, nonetheless render verdict in favor of the party opposing the motion. Edwards v. Walsh, 397 N.J. Super. 567, 571 (App. Div. 2007). Such motion should be denied when questions of credibility must be resolved by a jury. Alves v. Rosenberg, 400 N.J. Super. 553, 566 (App. Div. 2008).
Here, Judge Blue reasoned that the jury was faced with the task of deciding which expert was the more credible: Douglas's expert, Dr. Gleimer, who testified that Douglas's disc herniation was permanent and would adversely affect him indefinitely, or defendant's expert, Dr. Gerson, who opined that the herniation could as easily have been caused by a snowball thrown at Douglas's lower back years earlier as by the accident. Gerson also opined that many people who sustain a herniated disc are nonetheless able to function normally, and suffer no adverse sequelae as a result of the herniation. Under those circumstances, Judge Blue was correct when she found that the evidence was in such conflict that plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict should be denied. See Ibid.
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THIS IS A SAMPLE OF HOW SOME ACCIDENTCASES ARE DECIDED BY THE NJ COURTS. OUR FIRM DID NOT PARTICIPATE AS COUNSEL IN THIS CASE. THIS IS MERELY A SAMPLE SUMMARY FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES. PAST RESULTS DO NOT GUARANTEE FUTURE OUTCOME. THE SELECTION OF AN ATTORNEY IS IMPORTANT. GIVE THIS MATTER CAREFUL THOUGHT. SEE OUR ABOUT PAGE FOR LEGAL ADVERTISEMENT DISCLAIMER.
JANET HENEBEMA VS. DOMENICO RADDI, JR. (L-0964-07, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)
On remand, and ten years after a serious car accident, defendants raised for the first time the affirmative defenses of N.J.S.A. 52:17C-10 (9-1-1 dispatcher immunity) and N.J.S.A. 59:5-4 (failure to provide police protection). We concluded that the judge erred by (1) failing to resolve whether defendants waived the new defenses; and (2) dismissing the complaint relying on Royster v. N.J. State Police, 439 N.J. Super. 554 (App. Div. 2015), aff'd as modified, 227 N.J. 482 (2017) (dismissing a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act).
This case involves a misapplication of Royster v. N.J. State Police, 439 N.J. Super. 554, 561 (App. Div. 2015), aff'd as modified, 227 N.J. 482 (2017), which held that "the doctrine of state sovereign immunity preclude[d] [a] plaintiff's [Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)] claim, even though [the] defendants [had] not fully raise[d] that argument until their motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV)."
Plaintiff filed claims, not under the ADA, but rather, under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3, which unlike under the ADA, are not federal law claims. By enacting the TCA, the Legislature waived state sovereign immunity, subject to the statute's provisions.
Plaintiff appeals from orders dated December 7, 2015 and January 19, 2016 entered on remand granting summary judgment to South Jersey Transportation Authority (SJTA) and the New Jersey State Police (NJSP) (collectively defendants). In support of their motions, defendants belatedly raised the affirmative defenses of N.J.S.A. 52:17C-10 (9-1-1 dispatcher immunity) and N.J.S.A. 59:5-4 (failure to provide police protection).
Plaintiff maintains that the judge exceeded the scope of detailed remand instructions from this court and the Supreme Court, and he otherwise erred as a matter of law.
In a TCA case, when a public entity substantially waits before raising the affirmative defenses of N.J.S.A. 52:17C-10 and N.J.S.A. 59:5-4, we hold that the judge must first determine whether defendants waived those defenses. That is so because waiver negates reliance on the defenses. If the judge concludes that a public entity timely raised, and has not waived these affirmative defenses, then the judge should address whether dispositive relief is appropriate.
Here, the judge granted summary judgment before resolving whether defendants waived the affirmative defenses, even though defendants raised them for the first time on remand, which occurred ten years after the accident; those ten years included three years of extensive pre-trial litigation, a lengthy and expensive trial, an appeal to us, and an appeal to the Supreme Court. We conclude that defendants waived the new affirmative defenses, reverse the orders, and re-remand for a liability trial on an expedited basis due to the age of this case.
THIS IS A SAMPLE OF HOW SOME ACCIDENT CASES ARE DECIDED BY THE NJ COURTS. OUR FIRM DID NOT PARTICIPATE AS COUNSEL IN THIS CASE. THIS IS MERELY A SAMPLE SUMMARY FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES. PAST RESULTS DO NOT GUARANTEE FUTURE OUTCOME. THE SELECTION OF AN ATTORNEY IS IMPORTANT. GIVE THIS MATTER CAREFUL THOUGHT. SEE OUR ABOUT PAGE FOR LEGAL ADVERTISEMENT DISCLAIMER.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. WILLIAM T. LIEPE (12-12-2766, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(A-4431-14T4)
Defendant was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of twenty, seven, and five years, for first-degree aggravated manslaughter and two counts of second-degree aggravated assault, resulting from his having caused, while intoxicated, an auto accident that killed a nine-year old and seriously injured two others.
In State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 429 (2001), a divided Court determined that in multiple-victim vehicular-homicide matters, sentencingjudges should "ordinarily" impose "at least two consecutive terms." The Court, however, also emphasized that it had not "adopt[ed] a per se rule" and the decision to impose consecutive terms remained in the discretion of sentencingjudges. Id. at 419. In considering Carey's influence here, the court remanded for resentencing because, among other things, the sentencingjudge appeared to have viewed Carey as imposing a presumption in favor of consecutive terms and because the judge did not fairly consider the real-time consequence of the aggregate thirty-two year sentence, all subject to an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility, imposed on an offender who was fifty-eight at the time of the incident and sixty-two at the time of sentencing.
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If you are in need of legal help for any type of accident you are involved in, Attorney Rafael Gomez works in the following locations:
If you have been harmed by any type of accident, like the one shown in the video above, or have been injured in a car accident or a work accident, Bergen County's accident attorney Rafael Gomez is here to help you in the best possible way. For immediate help call now:
Teaneckis atownshipinBergen County,New Jersey, United States, and asuburbin theNew York metropolitan area. As of the2010 United States Census, the township's population was 39,776,reflecting an increase of 516 (+1.3%) from the 39,260 counted in the2000 Census, which had in turn increased by 1,435 (+3.8%) from the 37,825 counted in the1990 Census.As of 2010 it was the second-most populous among the 70 municipalities in Bergen County, behindHackensack, which had a population of 43,010.
Teaneck was created on February 19, 1895, by an act of the New Jersey Legislature from portions of Englewood Township and Ridgefield Township, both of which are now defunct (despite existing municipalities with similar names), along with portions of Bogota and Leonia. Independence followed the result of a referendum held on January 14, 1895, in which voters favored incorporation by a 46–7 margin. To address the concerns of Englewood Township's leaders, the new municipality was formed as a township, rather than succumbing to the borough craze sweeping across Bergen County at the time. On May 3, 1921, and again on June 1, 1926, portions of what had been Teaneck were transferred to Overpeck Township.
Teaneck lies at the junction of Interstate 95 and the eastern terminus of Interstate 80. The township is bisected into north and south portions by Route 4 and east and west by the CSX Transportation River Subdivision. Commercial development is concentrated in four main shopping areas, on Cedar Lane, Teaneck Road, DeGraw Avenue, West Englewood Avenue and Queen Anne Road, more commonly known as "The Plaza".
Teaneck's location at the crossroads of river, road, train and other geographical features has made it a site of many momentous events across the centuries. After the American defeat at the Battle of Fort Washington, George Washington and the troops of the Continental Army retreated across New Jersey from the British Army, traveling through Teaneck and crossing the Hackensack River at New Bridge Landing, which has since been turned into a state park and historic site commemorating the events of 1776 and of early colonial life. In 1965, Teaneck voluntarily desegregated its public schools, after the Board of Education approved a plan to do so by a 7–2 vote on May 13, 1964. Teaneck has a diverse population, with large Jewish and African American communities, and growing numbers of Hispanic and Asian residents.
Teterborois aboroughinBergen County, in theU.S. stateofNew Jersey. As of the2010 United States Census, the borough's population was 67,reflecting an increase of 49 (+272.2%) from the 18 counted in the2000 Census, which had in turn declined by 4 (−18.2%) from the 22 counted in the1990 Census.As of 2010, it is the fourth-smallestmunicipality, by population, in New Jersey.
Teterboro is the home of Teterboro Airport (operated by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey) which takes up a majority of the borough, as well as portions of Hasbrouck Heights and Moonachie.
According to the United States Census Bureau, the borough had a total area of 1.11 square miles (2.88 km2), including 1.11 square miles (2.87 km2) of land and <0.01 square miles (0.01 km2) of water (0.36%).
Hackensackaccident lawyer Rafael Gomez is able to help you with any type of accident, including car accidents, as in the video above. If you need immediate help with this type of case, call now:
Hackensackis acityinBergen CountyinNew Jersey, United States, and serves as itscounty seat.The area was officially namedNew Barbadoes Townshipuntil 1921, but it was informally known as Hackensack since at least the 18th century.As of the2010 United States Census, the city's population was 43,010, reflecting an increase of 333 (+0.8%) from the 42,677 counted in the2000 Census, which had, in turn, increased by 5,628 (+15.2%) from the 37,049 counted in the1990 Census.
An inner suburb of New York City, Hackensack is located approximately 12 miles (19 km) northwest of Midtown Manhattan and about 7 miles (11 km) from the George Washington Bridge. From a number of locations, the New York City skyline can be seen.
The Metropolitan Campus of Fairleigh Dickinson University straddles the Hackensack River in both Hackensack and Teaneck. Hackensack is also the home of the former New Jersey Naval Museum and the World War II submarine USS Ling. Astronaut Wally Schirra is perhaps Hackensack's most famous native son.
The city has diverse neighborhoods and land uses located close to one another. Within its borders are the prominent Hackensack University Medical Center, a trendy high-rise district about a mile long, classic suburban neighborhoods of single-family houses, stately older homes on acre-plus lots, older two-family neighborhoods, large garden apartment complexes, industrial areas, the Bergen County Jail, a tidal river, Hackensack River County Park, Borg's Woods Nature Preserve, various city parks, large office buildings, a major college campus, the Bergen County Court House, a vibrant small-city downtown district, and various small neighborhood business districts.
Hackensack, Bergen County Accident Attorney Rafael Gomez, has helped recover damages for people who have been injured in traffic accidents or any type of accident that has caused any kind of bodily injury.
THIS IS A SAMPLE OF HOW SOME ACCIDENTCASES ARE DECIDED BY THE NJ COURTS. OUR FIRM DID NOT PARTICIPATE AS COUNSEL IN THIS CASE. THIS IS MERELY A SAMPLE SUMMARY FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES
DIANE S. LAPSLEY VS. TOWNSHIP OF SPARTA, ET AL. (DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION)
Petitioner Diane Lapsley appealed from an order of a judge of compensation concluding that injuries she sustained in a February 3, 2014 accident arose out of and in the course of her employment as a Sparta Township librarian pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 to -146. After clocking out and exiting the library premises, petitioner was struck by a snowplow in an adjacent parking lot that happened to be owned by the township. The compensation judge concluded that petitioner'sinjuries were compensable pursuant to the premises rule, N.J.S.A. 34:15-36, which provides that "[e]mployment shall be deemed to commence when an employee arrives at the employer's place of employment to report for work and shall terminate when the employee leaves the employer's place of employment, excluding areas not under the control of the employer . . . ."
The court held that a mechanical application of the premises rule in the context of a public-entity employer deviates from well-settled principles applicable to private employers and invites an overbroad and unwarranted expansion of public-entity liability for workers' compensation claims. The court identified employer-directed control of an employee's use of a parking lot as a critical element in the application of the premises rule. See Novis v. Rosenbluth, 138 N.J. 92, 93 (1994). An injury will be compensable if it is sustained while the employee is using the lot where the manner of ingress or egress is dictated by the employer, or in an area where the employee parks at the employer's direction. Conversely, use of a shared parking lot that accommodates multiple tenants, without specific instruction from an employer, is not sufficient to satisfy to the premises rule.
The stipulated facts of this case established that petitioner's employer exercised no control of its employee's use of the common-use parking lot. Petitioner was off-the-clock at the time of the accident and had exited the library premises. Library employees were not given any instructions about where in the subject lot to park or indeed whether to park in that particular lot, on the street, or anywhere else in town where parking may be available. Nor were library staff instructed on the manner of ingress or egress. The lot was shared with other municipal employees and members of the public alike.
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Under these facts, the court concluded that there was no reasoned basis to depart from the general rule that the library's "use" of the common-use parking lot for its employees' benefit was not sufficient to satisfy the premises rule. Accordingly, the court reversed the compensation judge's order finding the accident was compensable.
